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Abstract 
The attention of policy makers on aviation environmental impacts has increased 
meaningfully over the last years. In order to limit the sector’s CO2 emissions, the 
EU has broadened the aviation industry part of the European Union Emission 
Trading Scheme (EU-ETS), from 1st January 2012 with the Directive 
101/2008/EC.  
The aim of this paper is to provide an estimation of the direct costs linked to EU-
ETS that the aviation sector is standing, reporting the case of Italy. In details, this 
work proposes a calculation of the EU-ETS direct costs that Italian airline 
companies, under the scheme, afforded over the period 2012-2014. Then, it 
presents a forecast of the EU-ETS direct costs for the years 2015-2016, referring 
to three scenarios related to different hypotheses on emission permit price (low, 
medium, high bounded scenarios), and on pass-through of those costs onto final 
passengers. Finally, the paper measures the effects of those costs in terms of 
change in airfares, revenues, and social costs. The calculations are obtained by 
following an economic model designed by the authors, which can also be extended 
to investigate other sectors covered by the EU-ETS. 
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Aviation and the Costs of the European Emission Trading Scheme: The 
case of Italy 
 
1. Introduction 
The attention of global policy makers on the aviation environmental impacts has 
increased meaningfully over the last years. In fact, the growth of the sector has 
induced significant drawbacks in terms of climate change, local air pollution, land 
contamination, and noise pollution. The primarily source of these negative 
externalities is the emission of carbon dioxide (CO2), directly computed as a 
proportion of burned fuel (Dessen et al., 2014).  
In Europe, the aviation sector currently accounts for about 5 and 27 per cent of 
total and transport greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions respectively. In particular, 
CO2 emissions are still growing at a rapid pace and have more than doubled over 
the last two decades, producing more than six times the emissions of the rail 
sector (Brack, 2013).  
This expansion is primarily due to a substantial increase of the air transport 
demand, expected to rise by 3,7 per cent per annum in the next years 
(Rothengatter, 2010; Cappoccitti et al., 2010) and driven by several factors. First 
of all, the gradual change in consumers’ behaviours has determined a growth in 
both tourism and trade flows (Gössling et al., 2012). In addition, the liberalization 
policies started in the Eighties have encouraged the entrance of low-cost 
competitors, lowering airfares and making this type of transport accessible to a 
wider range of passengers (Fu et al., 2010).   
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In order to prevent and limit sector emissions and to meet the European 
environmental goals for 2020 and beyond, the European Union (EU) has 
broadened the number of industries belonging to the European Union Emission 
Trading Scheme (EU-ETS), namely the first and largest international emissions 
trading scheme (Ellerman and Buchner, 2007; Meleo, 2010), including aviation 
from 1st January 2012 (Directive 101/2008/EC). In this way, air carriers have 
been asked to contribute to the reduction of GHG, implying additional costs 
(environmental costs) to manage. 
The aim of this paper is to provide an estimation of the direct costs linked to EU-
ETS stood by the aviation sector1 and their market equilibrium effects. 
In details, the Directive 101/2008/EC sets that all flights departing and arriving in 
an airport located within the European Economic Area (EEA)2 must be covered by 
the EU-ETS, regardless of the airline nationality3. The Directive has raised two 
                                                
1 The EU-ETS indirect costs originated by the electricity sector pass-through are not considered in 
this paper. 
2 The European Economic Area includes the 28 EU Member States, Iceland, Liechtenstein, and 
Norway. 
3  As for industrial plants, following a “top-down” mechanism (Meleo, 2014), the European 
Commission (EC) is responsible to set an emission cap for the aviation sector that is independent 
from the cap set for the other energy-intensive industries under EU-ETS. For 2012, the EC had to 
distribute a number of permits corresponding to 97 per cent of the aviation sector average 
historical emissions registered in the period 2004-2006 in Europe. In the following years (2013-
2020), the cap has been reduced to 95 per cent of the same average historical emissions. As 
regards the method of allocation, in 2012 the total permits issued by the EU had to be auctioned 
by 15 per cent and distributed 85 per cent for free, while in 2013-2020, 82 per cent of the cap 
has to be allocated for free, 15 per cent by auctions, and 3 per cent collected in a special reserve 
for new entrants. 
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different reactions. At first the opposition of non-European airlines, aviation 
lobbies, and extra-European policy makers. They were concerned about the 
additional costs that the EU-ETS would have caused (mainly the purchase of 
emission permits, new green investments, and administrative costs), and the likely 
distortion of the competitive equilibrium (Mitra, 2012; Preston et al., 2012). In 
addition, they claimed that the EU had applied a charge to flights outside its 
borders, without any previous agreement, apparently violating the Chicago 
Convention on International Civil Aviation4 signed in 1944. The political and judicial 
debate that followed the Directive has leaded the European Commission (EC) to 
introduce the so-called “stop the clock” derogation of 2013 (Decision 
2013/337/EU), followed by the Regulation 2014/421. These actions have 
suspended the Directive 2008/101/EC, waiting for an international agreement to 
set a single global market-based measure by 20205.  
The inclusion of the aviation sector within the scope of the EU-ETS has also raised 
concerns among many European airlines. In fact, the economic impact of the EU-
ETS on competitiveness is still one of the main debating points among firms and 
policy makers (International Air Carrier Association-IACA, 2008; Scheelhaase et al., 
2010; Kopsch, 2012; Meleo and Morelli, 2013). This has been especially true since 
                                                
4 The Convention prohibits the introduction of unilateral measures in the aviation field by the 
signatory countries. 
5  In details, Regulation 2014/421 indicates that: emissions from flights within the EEA are 
subjected to EU-ETS; the other flights are exempted for 2013; from 2014 EU-ETS will be enforced 
also for flights outside the EEA for the portion of the flights realised within the border of the EEA; 
flights that involve less developed countries are regulated with specific dispositions. After the 
2013 Decision, almost 59 per cent of the original free allowances returned to the EC (Sandbag, 
2013). 
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the adoption of Regulation 2014/421 as the EU airline carriers are required to 
obtain the highest number of allowances, given that their flights are primarily 
delivered in the EEA. In details, literature has found that the EU-ETS direct costs 
can affect the market equilibrium through a loss of market share (Faber and 
Brinke, 2011; Anger and Köhler, 2010), a change in entrance barriers (Barbot et 
al. 2014), or a reduction of profit margins (CE Delft, 2007; Frontier Economics, 
2006; Malina et al., 2012; Girardet and Splinler, 2013). As a consequence these 
effects could be amplified for those companies that could not offset the decrease 
in profits charging passengers (pass-through), or using any additional profits 
gained from extra-European flights6.   
In the context of this scenario, this paper estimates the EU-ETS direct costs 
reporting the case of the Italian aviation sector. The focus on Italy is significant 
because of the different attraction factors that sustain the demand of flights to 
and within the country, such as the historical, cultural and natural heritages as well 
as the “Made in Italy” productions. Given the lack of similar studies on Italy, this 
analysis is interesting and it may represent a starting point to serve further 
studies and policymaking in Italy and Europe. 
In details, this paper provides a calculation of the EU-ETS direct costs that Italian 
airline companies have faced over the period 2012-2015, based on the actual 
emissions verified by the European Commission, namely verified emissions7 (see 
                                                
6 Actually, the pass-through on final prices is a strategy that was announced and enforced by 
Ryanair that charged fare by 0,25 Euros per flight. Estimations indicated that Ryanair earned 
important windfall profits. 
7  Verified emissions represent the emissions communicated by firms to the European Single 
emission registry. These emissions are certified by accredited verifiers accordingly to the 
Monitoring and Reporting Regulation and to the Accreditation and Verification Regulation. 
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the Community Independent Transaction Log-CITL). Then, it presents a forecast of 
the EU-ETS direct costs for 2016, referring to three scenarios, more or less 
conservative, related to different hypotheses on emission permit price (low, 
medium, high bounded scenarios). Moreover, particular attention is drawn to the 
pass-through of these costs onto final passengers. Finally, the paper measures the 
effects of these costs in terms of changes in flight fares, revenues, and social 
costs. 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In section 2, it is outlined the 
methodology used in the analysis, providing an estimation procedure and, for 
years in which emissions are still to verified, a forecasting model. Section 3 
presents the data used to analyse the Italian case. To better represent the 
selected case, some hypotheses and simplifying assumptions are introduced. 
Section 4 proposes an application of the constructed theoretical framework 
analysing the Italian aviation sector case. Finally, some policy considerations 
conclude the work. 
 
2. Methods 
2.1. The economic model 
The EU-ETS is designed in order to reach the environmental goal of reducing CO2 
at the least possible cost option (cost effectiveness). It means that firms can buy 
permits from the carbon market and/or realising investments in new or sunrise 
technologies depending on the comparison between allowances price and marginal 
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abatement cost8. In both cases, firms incur in the so-called environmental costs or 
compliance costs that could negatively affect their competitiveness.  
In order to measure the effect of those compliance costs on firms’ performance, 
an important factor has to be considered, namely the ability of firms to pass those 
additional costs onto final consumers (pass-through) (Meleo, 2010, 2014). Where 
companies can pass on the full EU-ETS direct costs on to final price, there are not 
significant negative impacts on competitiveness, but some distributional effects 
arise. Otherwise, the pass-through to final price could lead firms to lose 
competitiveness as consumers could divert their demand to cheaper products, 
accordingly to demand price elasticity9; this is especially true if profit margin 
cannot absorb those costs. In this latter case, the only feasible solution is 
reducing the output (in this case, the number of flights) and thus incurring in 
significant allocative and productive inefficiencies (Meleo, 2014). As a 
consequence, it is important to consider the ability of firms to pass-through 
assessing by the “net direct costs” that burden on firms under EU-ETS. In this 
case this operation is realised taking into account, among the other variables, 
demand price elasticity10. 
In the context of these issues, an economic model-based approach suitable to 
assess the effects of EU-ETS in terms of change in costs, revenues and profits is 
defined. In order to model the profit function, a relation among the quantity of 
                                                
8 The marginal abatement cost indicates the additional costs a firm has to manage when increasing 
one emission reduction. It is a convex curve; this implies that the more a firm has introduced 
actions to reduce pollution, the higher the MAC for additional actions will be (Meleo, 2014). 
9 The higher the elasticity, the less pass-through strategy is profitable. 
10 In general, other factors influence the possibility to pass-through environmental costs on final 
prices, such as the exposure to international competition and market concentration (Meleo, 2014). 
9 
 
passenger-kilometres flown in period t (Qt) and the emission level in the same 
period (Et) is pointed out such that: Et =at Qt. The coefficient a represents a 
multiplier which approximates the average level of emissions per quantity in the tth 
year. If a is lowering from tn to tn+1, then the firm is making environmental 
improvements, implementing new green technologies e.g. In this paper, a 
simplified assumption is introduced fixing at=1 for every t so that Et=Qt. 
Given this hypothesis, the profit function for the aviation industry can be 
modelled. Before the inclusion of aviation sector in scope of the EU-ETS, in year t, 
profit function was 
(1) πt = Total Revenues – Total Costs = Pt Qt – ATCt Qt 
where ATCt is the average total cost11, Pt is the price and Qt is the quantity of 
passenger-kilometres flown in the tth year. After the inclusion of the aviation 
sector under the EU-ETS, the profit function is reduced by EU-ETS total direct 
costs (TDCETS, t), and becomes as below  
(2) πETS, t = PETS,t Qt – ATCt Qt – ADCETS,t Qt 
where TDCETS, t = ADCETS,t Qt. As far as revenues are concerned, they are influenced 
by the ability of the company to pass-through the EU-ETS direct costs on to finale 
price (PETS,t). PETS,t includes a component linked to the pass-through which is 
influenced by many variables such as demand price elasticity, market structure, 
and international openness. This means that total revenues and, as a consequence, 
airline profits could be reduced in case firms try to charge environmental costs 
                                                
11 Notice that total non-ETS costs can vary accordingly to the reaction of the demanded quantity. 
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onto final price12. To include this point, a coefficient b with value in [0,1] to 
measure the pass-through realised for the average total EU-ETS direct cost 
(ADCETS,t) is introduced. In this way, PETS,t depends both on the price before the EU-
ETS (PB) and on the percentage of the average EU-ETS direct cost passed-
through:   
(3) PETS,t = PB + bt ADCETS,t 
In terms of total revenues, this means that: 
(4) TRETS,t = PB Qt +bt TDCETS,t 
Given the revenue function, in order to describe TDCETS, three basic assumptions 
are discussed below: 
i) most firms show AMC higher than the price of a single emission unit, 
being net buyers of permits; 
ii) residual firms make investments to reduce CO2 (e.g. investments to 
improve energy efficiency), being net sellers of permits; 
iii) the AMC is higher than the abatement cost of one pollution unit for most 
of the firms.  
                                                
12 In fact, the variation of the latter also depends on the demand and, in particular, on its price 
elasticity. It is intuitive that, given a linear demand function Qt = a0 – a1 Pt, consumer reaction to an 
increase of Pt is a reduction of Qt, with a magnitude that depends on a1. In particular, the demand 
price elasticity can be modelled as below: 
ed=(∂Q/∂P) (Pt/Qt)= - a1 ( PB + bt ADCETS,t)/( a0 – a1 PB – a1 bt ADCETS,t)  
If bt increases (i.e. there is an increase in the pass-through effect) then ed decreases as well as if 
ADCETS,t increases. 
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These assumptions indicate that the offer of emission permits is less than or equal 
to the demand in carbon market. Such hypothesis is reasonable given that the 
aviation industry has already made important investments aimed to reduce fuel 
consumption (thus dropping CO2) and to limit the incremental costs due to the 
rise of kerosene price over the last years. As a consequence, given the shape of 
the AMC curve, additional investments aimed at reducing CO2 emissions, could 
result in very high costs, difficult to manage in the short run. It implies that the 
AMC could be easily higher than the cost of one emission permit. This assumption 
is even more realistic when considering the average permit price recorded after 
2008 which dropped off because of the allowance oversupply resulting from the 
economic crisis: spot price lowered from 22 Euro/t CO2 to 6 Euro/t CO2 on 
average in 2008 and 2014 respectively.  
Given this framework, the estimation of the EU-ETS total direct costs (TDCETS, t) in 
a specific year t is obtained by referring to the equation (5). Here the TDCETS 
simplifying the notation is proposed, by dropping the year indicator. In short, 
these costs are obtained as the sum of the costs to purchase auctioned 
allowances, those to purchasing permits on the market and those associated to 
the civil penalties (imposed in case not having surrendered allowances for a 
number equal to the verified emissions by the deadlines indicated by the 
Directive). Moreover, TDCETS are reduced by all revenues realised by selling 
allowance surplus on carbon market. The equation below sums up the component 
of the TDCETS : 
(5) TDCETS = ∑in= 1 (pa Qai + pm Qmi + s Qni – pm Qvi) 
where the variables introduced represent: 
- pa = allowance auction price  
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- Qai = number of allowances purchased by the ith operator by auctions 
- pm = allowance market price on the secondary market 
- Qmi = number of permits purchased on the secondary market by the ith 
operator 
- s = penalty applied to emission units not covered by allowances (or applied 
to allowances that are not returned) 
- Qni = number of allowances not returned by the ith operator 
- Qvi = number of allowances sold by the ith operator 
- Ei = actual or verified emissions of the ith operator 
- Qtfi = total free allowances for the ith operator 
The number of permits not surrendered can be written as Qni = Ei - Qtfi – Qai – Qmi + 
Qvi. This recursive derivation of Qni depends, first of all, on the relationship among 
variables Ei and Qtfi. If Ei - Qtfi is a negative quantity, then, there are more 
allowances than what is needed. In other words, in this case it is expected that Qai 
= Qmi = 0 as well as Qni, and Qvi>0. The other way round, if the difference among 
emissions and free allowances is positive, then Qvi=0 and all the other quantities 
(Qai, Qmi, Qni) are positive. Moreover, three other assumptions regarding TDCETS 
variables are introduced as described below:  
i. the number of permits purchased on the secondary market has to be less 
than the actual CO2 emissions for the ith operator (Qmi < Ei); 
ii. the emission level for the single operator can be greater or equal to the sum 
of the total number of purchased allowances (Qai + Qmi ≤ Ei); 
iii. the number of allowances sold is less than the number of allowances 
purchased on the secondary market (Qmi > Qvi). 
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The approach here described, based on historical data, could be modified in order 
to define a forecast model. This appears particularly useful where data are not 
available or in order to figure out some forecasts for the years to come. This 
model is based on the following variables: 
- ge = CO2 emission growth rate13; 
- ra = auctioned permit rate with respect to total emissions; 
- rn = not surrendered permit rate with respect to total emissions; 
- rv = sold permit rate with respect to total emissions. 
In particular, referring to the period t, the emission growth rate for the ith operator 
and for the sector are computed respectively as:  
(6) gei,t=(Ei,t- Ei,t-1)/Ei,t-1    ge,t=(Et- Et-1)/Et-1 
where Et indicates the total sector CO2 emissions in period t. The emission growth 
rate to use in such a simulation is the arithmetic mean of the ge,t for a significant 
period of time (i.e. from t to t+l): 
 (7) ge= (∑jl= 0 ge,t+j ) / l 
Similarly, if a time series on the number of auctioned not surrendered and sold 
allowances is available, then it will be possible to easily calculate the related rates 
(ra, rn, rv) referring to a specific period of time. Differently, some assumptions have 
to be introduced to define ra, rn and rv that can vary accordingly to the 
characteristics of the sector considered for the analyses (see Section 3). Thus, if 
the TDCETS for the aviation sector have to be forecast for the t+kth year (with k>l), 
                                                
13 This rate depends on several variables. Among the others, it recalls the growth in GDP, in 
business and tourism demand (that depends also on GDP growth), and future “green” investments. 
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specific assumptions over pa, pm, s, ge, ra and rv are needed. In particular, the EU-
ETS total direct costs can be forecast accordingly to the equation below14: 
(8) TDCETS,t+k= (1+ge)k-l Et+l [ra (pa,t+k - pm,t+k) + rn (st+k – pm,t+k) – 2 pm,t+k rv] 
In Section 3 an empirical application to the Italian aviation sector of the present 
model is pointed out, accordingly to equations (5), and (8). 
3. The data used for the analysis of the Italian aviation sector 
The analysis proposed in this paper covers the time period spanning from 2012 to 
2016. This choice is justified firstly because 2016 represents the last year of the 
first EU-ETS allocation period for the aviation sector, and secondly, after 2016, 
some regulatory changes are expected. As mentioned in the introduction, 
according to 2013 settlement between EC and ICAO that led to the “stop the 
clock” Decision, a new agreement on a global market-based measure for aviation 
sector has to be reached within 2016, with possible changes in the current rules. 
Calculations are based on data collected by different sources. At first, data on 
allocated allowances and verified emissions were obtained respectively from the 
Italian Committee for the management and implementation of Directive 
2003/87/EC (Decisions n. 2011/36 and n. 2014/27), and the CITL.  
Verified emissions are currently available for the years 2012-2014 (see CITL, last 
access 25th May 2015) thus, for 2015 and 2016, it is assumed that emissions 
evolve at the average emission growth rate (ge) registered in 2008-2012 (-1.393 
per cent given equation (5)). This assumption on ge is coherent with the CO2 
emissions development observed for the Italian aviation sector over the last years. 
In particular, considering the time span 2008-2012, without loss of generality, it is 
                                                
14 For extra details over the model assumptions see the Appendix A. 
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possible to take into account the reaction of aircraft operators to several factors 
such as the introduction of the Directive 2008/101/EC, the economic crisis, and 
the latest green investments and measures implemented by the Italian airlines.  
Referring to the amount of auctioned allowances, it is important to remind that in 
Italy there have been no auctions since 2012 (Qa=0) as it has happened in the 
other EEA States except for Germany. This is not only due to organisational 
reasons (given the limited experience with regards to auctioning) but also to the 
regulatory uncertainty that followed the “stop the clock” Decision. As a 
consequence, the number of freely allocated allowances is equal to the total 
allowances distributed throughout to the sector. As declared by several Italian 
policy maker announcements (Gestore dei Servizi Elettrici – GSE, 2014), it is 
assumed that a part of the total allowances will be granted by 2016 auctions so a 
ra=15 per cent as indicated by the Directive 2008/101/EC.  
Permit surplus and deficit used for estimations are obtained as the difference 
between verified emissions and total allocated allowances (Tab. 1). In the years 
taken into consideration in this analysis, emissions decreased from 3.449.656 to 
2.058.559 tonnes of CO2 (about 40%). For the entire period of the analysis, the 
allocated allowances have been lower than actual emissions as it should be in order 
to provide airline companies with the proper incentives to reduce CO2 emissions, 
except for 2012. This is due probably to the fact that 2012 was the first 
enforcement year for aviation, so a first stage to start to make further 
adjustments. In addition, the vast allowances distributed in 2012, compared to 
the ones allocated in the other years, are the result of the amendments 
introduced by the “stop the clock” Decision that have temporally exempted extra-
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European airline companies from the EU-ETS (opt-out option). It means that the 
allowances previously allocated to those companies were surrendered to the EC.  
As regards the differences between verified emissions and total allocated 
allowances, only 2012 shows a quite important permit surplus, while the data on 
2013-2016 indicate a decreasing deficit that will reach 302.302 tonnes of CO2 in 
2016. However, it is important to remind that the deficit calculated for 2016 
includes the assumption that 15% of the allowances will be auctioned in addition 
to the allowances to distribute free of charge. 
 
Here Table 1 
 
As far as the carbon prices (pm) used for the calculations, the average daily price 
recorded for each year from 2012 to 2014 is referred to. On the other hand for 
2015 the average price from the 1st of January to the 24th May is considered. In 
order to forecast permit price for 2016, three scenarios are considered (Tab. 2), 
accordingly to different permit price assumptions. In particular, scenario A refers 
to the current permit price equal to 7,1 Euro/t CO2, while scenarios B and C 
consider a higher carbon price equal to 15 and 25 Euro/tonne of CO2 respectively. 
The choice of 15 and 25 is related to a scenario in which the flight demand will 
increase by roughly 4% and 8% per annum (Scheelhaase et al., 2010).  
The auction price is set to be the same of the market price, accordingly to the 
different scenario. This assumption is consistent given that, in January-July 2014, 
the average auction price, recorded in Germany (the only Member State which had 
set-up auctions for the aviation sector) was equal to 5,7 Euro/t CO2 against an 
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average secondary market quotation of 5,6 Euro/t CO2 for the same time period 
(German Emission Trading Authority, 2014; SendeCO2 database). 
These scenarios on carbon prices are divided in sub-scenario 1 (A1, B1, C1), and 2 
(A2, B2, C2). Sub-scenario 1 reflects the hypothesis that the company surrenders 
to EC an amount of allowances15 equal to the actual emissions, so no sanction is 
enforced. Scenario A2 assumes the opposite situation in which aviation companies 
cannot return to EC a number of allowances that exceed the actual emission by10 
per cent, in this case paying a sanction of 100 Euro/tonne of CO2 as indicated by 
the Directive (Tab. 2). 
 
Here Table 2 
 
The estimation and forecast of the effects in Italy of EU-ETS direct costs strongly 
depend on the identification of the demand price elasticity for the aviation sector. 
As a proxy the world price elasticity demand, estimated equal to -2,03 
(InterVistas, 2007)16 is selected.  
Finally, the values 0%, 50% and 100% associated to the parameter b to describe 
the pass-through effect are considered. In particular, these values are coherent 
with the literature and with different competitive market structures reported by 
many authors (see Ten Kate and Niels, 2005; Zimmerman and Carlson, 2010). 
                                                
15 Received at the beginning of the period or purchased from carbon market (Qmi). 
16 They use an autoregressive distributed lag model which estimates the price elasticity, in terms 
of the ratio among the percentage quantity variation and the percentage price variation, to be -
2.03. 
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4. Results and discussion 
In this section the results of the analysis present the estimated EU-ETS total 
direct costs borne by Italian aviation sector, and their impacts in terms of change 
in flight price, revenues, and social costs measured with the change in consumer 
surplus.  
Before illustrating these results, it is necessary to point out that the data 
described below only refer to the Italian airline companies (so extra-European 
aviation companies whose reference State for EU-ETS is Italy are excluded). There 
are 10 companies involved in this analysis. Among them, Alitalia, the biggest 
Italian company, owns 68,4% of the freely allocated allowances. 
Table 3 shows firstly the EU-ETS direct costs over the period 2012-2015 based 
on the surplus and deficit calculated for each year. It is quite clear that the vast 
allowance surplus recorded in 2012, equal to 10.699.740 Euros, implies important 
potential revenues in case permits were all sold on carbon market. The dimension 
of these financial extra-gains represents the main reason why some extra-
European airline companies do not opt-out after the exemptions introduced with 
the “stop the clock” Decision of 2013 (Korea air, and Nippon Air e.g.).  
However, looking at the years 2013-2015, after the 2012 surplus, the trend 
inverted and the sector has experienced a shortage of allowances compared to the 
actual emissions. In details, the value of the deficit has grown from 3.369.046 
Euros of 2013 to 4.221.578 Euros of 2015, with an average cost equal to 
151.195 Euro per year, and a cumulative cost of 604.778 Euros (both including 
2012).  
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Here Table 3 
 
Accordingly to prediction for 2016, the EU-ETS direct costs will vary between 
4,02 and 15,54 million Euros, depending on the different assumptions set for 
allowance price, the number of auctioned allowances, and the sanction 
enforcement (Table 4).  
In details, if pm stands at the same level registered for the first months of 2015, 
then EU-ETS direct costs will fluctuate between 4,02 and 6,83 million Euros. If 
carbon price grows to 15 Euro/t CO2, then the costs will range 8,49 and 11,06 
million Euros. Finally, in case of pm equal to 25 Euro/t CO2, costs will raise from 
12,87 to 15,14 million Euros. 
 
Here Table 4 
 
If the forecasts for 2016 are included to the cumulative compliance costs 
calculated for 2012-2015, the value raises and varies between 4,62 and 7,43 
million Euros in case of scenario A. For the same years, scenario B indicates that 
the estimated EU-ETS direct costs fluctuate between 48,68 and 61,53 million 
Euros. Finally, scenario C shows that these costs range between 13,47 and 15,74 
million Euros. 
 
Here Table 5 
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In order to complete the analysis, it is necessary to evaluate the impact of the 
estimated compliance costs on airfares, revenues and on social costs for each year 
considered in this work, taking 2012 as a base year. As specified before, changes 
in carbon price and the consequent changes in flight prices, revenues, and social 
costs are strictly related to the possibility of passing through the EU-ETS costs 
onto final passengers.  
According to the costs estimated above, the impact on flight price and on 
revenues appears quite limited (Tab. 7). In fact, in case the coefficient of pass-
through is different from zero, there is a very limited flight price increase in case 
b=50%, equal to 0,067%, 0,95%, and 0,115% in 2013, 2014, 2015 respectively. 
This had led to a reduction of the revenues by only 0,069%, 0,099%, and 0,119% 
over the same three years. Even assuming a pass-through rate of 100%, the 
effects on airfares and revenues are still limited. In fact, final price increase stays 
under 1%, namely 0,134%, 0,191%, and 0,231% for the same period, 
corresponding to a revenue cut by only 0,139%, 0,197%, and 0,239% once more 
for 2013, 2014, and 2015. 
 
Here Table 6 
 
For 2016, the situation appears quite similar, even if the magnitude of changes in 
flight price and revenues is higher than the years before (Tab. 7). Assuming three 
different carbon prices (7,1; 15; 25 Euro/t CO2), and the sanction enforcement 
for sub-scenario A2, B2, and C2, in case the pass-through is 50%, flight price grows 
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by 0,066-0,113%, 0,140-0,182%, and 0,212-0,250%. If there is a full pass-
through, airfares rise by 0,133-0,225%, 0,280-0,365%, and 0,425-0,499%. In 
the same way, there is a negative change in revenues, but it stays again below 
1%. In fact, assuming once more the three above mentioned carbon prices, 
revenues decrease by 0,068-0,116%, 0,145-0,189%, 0,220%-0,258% in case of 
a pass-through rate of 50%, and by 0,137-0,233%, 0,290-0,378%, and 0,441-
0,520% in case of full pass-through. 
In light of the recorded change in flight prices and revenues, it is useful to provide 
a picture of the effects that these costs have had on the final consumer, in order 
to quantify also the social costs linked to the inclusion of aviation under the scope 
of EU-ETS. As mentioned above, the social costs are measured as the change in 
consumer surplus (W). Table 8 provides this information referring as before to 
three different assumptions on the pass-through rate b (0%; 50%; 100%). In the 
intermediate scenario (b=50%), the change in consumer surplus is quite limited 
but still higher than the change in airline operators’ revenues. It generates an 
increase of social costs equal to 1,341, 1,904, and 2,301% in 2013, 2014, 2015 
respectively. In the high bounded scenario where EU-ETS costs are entirely 
reversed into final prices, social costs increased by 2,676, 3,796, and 4,587% 
over the same years. It indicates that, even in case of full pass-through, the costs 
of society for the internalisation of the air pollution costs linked to flights stay 
below 5%.  
 
Here Table 8 
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The change in social costs due to the EU-ETS is measured also for 2016, 
according to the assumptions used before on carbon prices, auction prices and 
sanction enforcement (Table 9). Again, the estimation for 2016 indicates that, in 
case of a 50% pass-through rate, social costs increase by 1,323-2,244%, 2,788-
3,628%, 4,129-4,957% for scenario A, B, and C respectively. In case of full pass-
through, social costs grow by 2,640-4,4473%, 5,553-7,215%, and 8,383-
9,837%. These results show again that the higher the carbon price is, the more 
social costs are progressively significant.  
 
Here Table 9 
 
Summing up, from the data illustrated, at the moment, EU-ETS direct costs appear 
quite limited as well as their impacts in terms of social costs. However, in order to 
broaden this analysis and to provide further information about the effects linked 
to EU-ETS compliance costs, the remaining of this section will show what could 
happen in case of wider changes in compliance costs, demand price elasticity, and 
pass-through rate.  
The Figures below provide some plots related to different scenarios. First of all, it 
is assumed the coefficient of pass-through b varying between 0 and 117. The 
extreme values represent, respectively, no pass-through or full pass-through. For 
the sake of simplicity, different EU-ETS costs as percentage of the initial flights 
                                                
17 Specifically, b is set to be equal to 0.0; 0.1; 0.2; 0.3; 0.4; 0.5; 0.6; 0.7; 0.8; 0.9; 1.0. 
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price p0 are assumed and in this case a change from 0,0 to 0,1 is considered (e.g. 
C=%p0). 
In particular, in Figure 1 the change in flight price is plotted according to the 
different pass-through rate (b), and to different compliance costs. The lines in the 
chart identify the latter. With the black line a situation in which EU-ETS costs are 0 
is indicated. These costs grow, as the lines get lighter. It is to notice that the 
change in price is quite limited regardless the EU-ETS direct cost dimensions where 
the pass-through stays roughly below 0,05. In fact, in this case, price variation is 
always less than 1%. An increasing pass-through rate causes a more than 
proportional price rise accordingly to the different cost level taken into account. 
 
Here Figure 1 
 
In addition, Figure 2 explains the change in revenues according to different 
hypotheses on the EU-ETS direct cost levels (again expressed as percentage of 
the initial price p0, and in a business as usual scenario). The lines in the figures 
indicate the pass-through rate; the black line refers to a situation in which pass-
through rate is zero, while this rate grows as the lines get lighter. In the most 
conservative scenario (EU-ETS direct cost equal to 1% of the price), revenues do 
not vary significantly if demand price elasticity stays at very low levels, again 
below about 4-5%, independently from the pass-through rate. However, when 
demand price elasticity grows further, the revenues can vary significantly 
according to the different hypotheses on compliance costs magnitude. Notice, in 
particular, that for low levels of the pass-through and the demand elasticity, 
positive revenue variations are registered. On the other side, when they reach 
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higher levels, the demand drops to zero and revenue variations settle down to the 
-100%. It is important to remind that the demand price elasticity is quite low at 
the moment and it is not expected to vary significantly in the short-medium run; it 
means that revenue variation will stay roughly under 5%.  
 
Here Figure 2 
 
Finally, Figure 3 proposes the social cost variation related to the pass-through of 
the ETS costs. Higher variations are registered if, in absolute value, the demand 
price elasticity is low. Moreover, the remarkable change in curve slope is 
associated, also in this case, to the fall in market demand.  
 
Here Figure 3 
 
In light of these results, some considerations are necessary. As highlighted, EU-
ETS direct costs have had limited impacts on both airline companies and 
consumers up to now. This situation appears to be in contrast with companies 
concerns about the alleged distortive effects that including the aviation sector 
under the purposes of EU-ETS would have implied in the short run. Referring to the 
Italian scenario, this represents “good news” given the economic performance of 
the ten Italian airline companies part of the EU-ETS, in particular of Alitalia, the flag 
carrier, former public company, late privatised in 1998. In fact, in 2013 (latest 
data available on AIDA database), 8 companies out of 10 recorded negative 
profits, and 6 out of 10 recorded negative EBITDA as well. In particular, Alitalia, as 
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mentioned the company owning a share of free allowances equal to 68.4% with 
the highest permit deficit in 2013-2014 (CITL database), has recorded negative 
EBITDA over the last 10 years except for 2010 and 2011. This is primarily due to 
several factors not related to EU-ETS. In fact, after years of serious deficit, in 
2008-2009 it went bankrupt and was merged to another bankrupted Italian 
company, Airone, and acquired by a consortium of Italian entrepreneurs (CAI). CAI 
purchased the capital formerly owned by the Italian State. However, in 2013, after 
recording new losses, in order to re-launch the company, 49% of the capital was 
acquired by Ethiad airways, the Abu-Dhabi flag company, while 51% is still in the 
hand of CAI.  
 
5. Conclusions and policy implications 
This paper provides an estimation of the direct costs arising from the inclusion of 
the aviation sector under the scope of the EU-ETS, presenting the Italian case 
study. According to the estimation, in 2016 total direct costs for the Italian 
sector will vary from a minimum of 4,62 to a maximum of 15,74 million Euros. 
These costs have generated effects on both prices and revenues, depending on 
the different assumptions made on carbon price, sanctions and allowance auctions 
for 2016. As a consequence, the social costs generated are still not significant, 
and will stay below 5% in 2016.  
The results highlight that direct costs linked to EU-ETS and their impact on both 
companies and final consumers are currently quite limited. However, these costs 
are expected to slightly increase starting from 2016, amplifying the impact on 
airfares, revenues, and social costs. This growth tendency is due to two main 
reasons.  
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First, the allowance surplus recorded for the aviation sector in 2012 is going to be 
absorbed; second, the increase of GHG emissions expected once the economic 
crisis comes to an end will ask firms under EU-ETS to buy additional permits. Both 
the events will push carbon and auction prices higher (average carbon spot price 
from January to May 25th 2015 is 7,01 Euro/ t CO2 against 5,87 Euro/ t CO2 of 
the same period for 2014). It means that, even if EU-ETS direct costs have not 
been so important currently due to the vast surplus allowances and to a very low 
carbon price, new cost increases are expected, with different effects depending on 
the values of pass-through, demand price elasticity and, even more important, 
carbon price as showed in the Figures 1 and 2.  
Presented results have interesting implications to guide new policy maker actions 
also for stationary plants. So far, if this is the case, the functioning of the EU-ETS 
will probably be improved trying to reinforce the economic incentives to innovate 
in green solutions (with a cut of the allocated free allowances i.e.). On the other 
hand, if this is the EC position, policy makers should take into account the 
economic performance of the sector as several companies, at least in the Italian 
framework, have experienced prolonged financial problems over the latest 
decades, as well as the distributional effects of this regulatory instrument.  
Assuming that carbon prices will increase as it is likely to be, then airline carriers 
as well as policy makers need to define a set of long-term strategies linked to 
sustainability, in order to protect competitiveness while preserving air quality 
beside the two options “buying allowances from carbon market” or “invest in 
green solutions”.  
Companies could explore innovative solutions regarding the use of alternative 
energy sources such as photovoltaic, fuel cells or even green fuels (biofuels). 
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Actually, many companies have already moved in this direction such as, among the 
others, Boeing and Airbus. In 2008, the latter has partnered with Honeywell 
Aerospace, International Aero Engines, and Jet Blue for the development of 
second generation biofuels (Capoccitti et al., 2010).  
In addition, following a stakeholder engagement approach, firms can involve 
passengers in their programs of emission reduction. The airlines could define and 
launch initiatives in which passengers can choose to purchase the quantity of 
emissions generated by their flights whose amount can vary according to the 
carbon footprint of the passenger (e.g. the amount of luggage, the flight distance, 
the environmental performance of the aircraft, etc.). This kind of strategy applies 
the “polluter pays” principle, but, in order to be acceptable from a social 
viewpoint, it should not be mandatory and should be defined to avoid the full 
burden of EU-ETS costs on consumers, and to prevent airline carriers from 
hazardous behaviours like in enforcing market distortive actions such as “windfall 
profit strategies”. 
Finally, some efforts can be made also by policy makers in optimizing the air traffic 
management performance and, more in general, to rationalise the entire transport 
system of the country. According to the IATA (2007), a more effective global air 
traffic management could reduce inefficiencies by 12 per cent. This can also 
include the promotion of intermodal transport solutions, a strategy that many 
European Members have already been using. For instance, after their merging, 
Dutch airline and KLM abolished several flights of short distance covered by high-
speed rail lines (Balch, 2009). 
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APPENDIX A 
Here some details on the construction and extensions of formula in Section 2 are 
proposed. It can be notice that, given the decomposition of the number of not 
returned permits as Qni = Ei - Qtfi – Qai – Qmi + Qvi, equation (4) can be rewritten as 
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TDCETS = ∑in= 1 [pa Qai + pm Qmi + s (Ei - Qtfi – Qai – Qmi + Qvi) – pm Qvi] 
      = ∑in= 1 [(pa – s) Qai + (pm –s) Qmi + s (Ei – Qtfi) – (pm – s) Qvi]  
In the forecast procedure, the following structure of total direct costs is defined: 
TDCt+k= pa,t+k Qa,t+k + pm,t+k Qm,t+k + st+k Qn,t+k – pm,t+k Qv,t+k 
Where, given total emissions verified Et+l, the following relations are considered 
• Et+k = (1+ge)k-l Et+l 
• Qa,t+k = ra Et+k 
• Qn,t+k = rn Et+k 
• Qv,t+k = rv Et+k 
• Qm,t+k = (1- ra – rv - rn) Et+k 
Then, the previous equation can be rewritten in the following manner, as described 
in Section 2: 
TDCETS,t+k= (1+ge)k-l Et+l [ra (pa,t+k - pm,t+k) + rn (st+k – pm,t+k) – 2 pm,t+k rv] 
 
 
 
 
